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SITUATION III 
STRAITS IN PEACE AND WAR 
The relations of adjacent states C and D are strained. 
Both states are parties to the Pact of Paris of August 27, 
1928. A dispute in regard to the title of Narrow Island, 
20 miles in length, having one end 1% miles off the coast 
of state C and the other end 6 miles off the coast of state 
D, has continued since 1900. The strait between Narrow 
Island and the mainland widens to 12 miles in the middle 
and the navigable channel is within 2 miles of state C for 
3 miles. Each state in 1933 lands forces on the nearer 
end of the island and vessels of war of each are at the 
respective ends of the strait between the island and main-
land. The strait is the more convenient and co1nmonly 
used though not the sole "\vaterway in the region. 
(1) Passage through the strait is refused by statBs C 
and D and their vessels of "\Var threaten to maintain the 
closure. 
The Circa, a vessel of war of state C, 5 1niles to sea-
"\vard of Narrow Isl~nd, orders the B ara, a merchant 
vessel of state B, not to use its radio for any purpose 
while in the neighborhood. The B ara insists upon pro-
ceeding through the strait and on the use of its radio. 
(a) What are the rights of states C and D? 
(b) vVhat are the rights of other states? 
( o) What are the rights of the Bara, both outside and 
within the strait? 
(2) Later state D, maintaining that the action of 
state C already constitutes war, issues a declaration of 
"\Var against state C. 
State C then gives notice that, in self-defense, it has 
rp.ined its end of the strait. 
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(a) \Vhat are the rights of states C and D? 
(b) \Vhat are the rights of other states? 
( o) What would be the rights of the B ara after the 
declaration? 
SOLUTION 
1. In ti1n.e of peaoe.-(a) States 0 and D have no ex-
ceptional rights of jurisdiction over a strait along their 
coasts connecting generally used 'vater areas, though 
states C and D may take action necessary for self-
defense. 
(b) Vessels of other states have the right of innocent 
passage through the strait but they are subject to reason-
able regulations while 'vithin the territorial waters of 
Cor D. 
( o) The B ara as a merchant vessel of state B is en-
tirely exe1npt :fro1n the jurisdiction of state C while on 
the high sea but must con:forn1 to the regulations of 
states 0 and D when within the jurisdiction of those 
states. 
2. In ti'lne of ~oar.-(a) States C and D have a right 
to regulate the use of their territorial waters and the 
"\Vaters within the immediate area of their operations. 
(b) Vessels of neutral states have the right of inno-
cent passage through the strait though they are subject 
to reasonable regulations while 'vithin the territorial 
v;aters of C or D. In view of the :fact that the strait 
is not the sole but the more convenient and comn1only 
used water,vay, the rights of C or D may as an extre1ne 
n1easure extend to closing of the strait. 
( o) After the declaration of war, the B ara as a mer-
chant vessel of state B, is under obligation to observe 
the regulations of state C or D when within the terri-
torial jurisdiction or the immediate area of the opera-
tion of their :forces. 
NOTES 
Strained relations.-The relations bet,veen neighbor-
ing states are rarely such as to be 'vithout strain at 
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son1e point. 'fhe existence of such states as political 
entities is in itself an indication that the public well-
being of each is vie,ved as so1newhat different; other-
'vise they 1night unite. 
One of the n1ost frequent bases of differences bet\veen 
adjacent states has been in regard to boundaries or ter-
ritorial clai1ns. Frequently boundary conventions have 
been clra,vn up \vithout adequate kno,vledge of the 
geography of the area inYolvecl and subsequent investi-
gations have sho\vn that the distinctive characteristics 
do not exist. Even 1nountain ranges and rivers in so1ne 
cases ha Ye not been found \Vi thin the area n1entioned in 
a convention or not at the supposed location. Clain1s and 
countercla in1s have easily arisen as settlers n1ove into 
such areas or valuable deposits of 1ninerals are found 
in the region. Even the n1ere desire on the part of a 
state to extend its territorial jurisdiction over barren 
or unoccupied territory 1nay give. rise to contention. 
Ethnic questions have often brought states into antag-
onisin. 
Strained relations is a ter1n which has been used to 
indicate an attitude of opposition of states to one an-
other in any degree short of \Var. Such relations often 
lead to \Yar but are not war and the existence of these 
relations does not bring into operation the law of war. 
The Pact of Paris.-The so-called "Pact of Paris" of 
August 27, 1928, or the Treaty for the Renunciation of 
vVar, gre\v out of the draft of a proposed bilateral pact 
of perpetual friendship between France and the United 
States which had been under consideration by the two 
po\vers fro1n June, 1927. In the 'note of the American 
Secretary of State, December 28, 1927, advocating the 
extension of the treaty in such manner as to include the 
principal powers of the world, it was said that this 
would be "an impressive example to all other Nations 
of the world " in " condemning war and renouncing it 
as an instrument of national policy in favor of the pacific 
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settlement of international disputes." The French reply 
of January 5, 1928, was that France was prepared to 
join the United States in renouncing "all war of aggres-
sion " in favor of employment of pacific means. 
When in a note of January 11, 1928, the American 
Secretary of State raised question as to the proposal to 
limit the multilateral treaty to wars of aggression, the 
French Government replied that most of the principal 
powers were members of the League of Nations and 
They are already bound to one another by a Covenant placing 
them under reciprocal obligations, as well as by agreements such 
as those signed at Locarno in October 1925, or by international 
conventions relative to guaranties of neutrality, all of which en-
gagements impose upon them duties which they can not 
contravene. 
In particular, Your Excellency knows that all states members of 
the League of Nations represented at Geneva in the month of 
September last, adopted, in a joint resolution tending to the con-
demnation of war, certain principles based on the respect for the 
reciprocal rights and duties of each. In that resolution the 
powers were led to specify that the action to be condemned as an 
international crime is aggressive war and that all peaceful means 
must be employed for the settlement of differences, of any nature 
whatsoever, which might arise between the several states. 
(Treaty for Renunciation of War. Text of the Treaty, Notes 
Exchanged, Instruments of Ratification, etc. U.S. Government 
Publication No. 468, p. 20.) 
This note went even further and, proposing sanctions, 
said: 
The Government of the Republic has always, under all circum-
stances, very clearly and without mental reservation declared its 
readiness to join in any declaration tending to denounce war 
as a crime and to set up international sanctions. susceptible of 
preventing or repressing it. (Ibid., p. 21.) 
It was clearly stated that the Pact in no way " Either 
Yiolates the specific obligations imposed by the Covenant 
or conflicts 'vith the fundamental idea and purpose of 
the League of Nations. * * * If, however, such a 
de.claration were accompanied by definitions of the word 
~ aggressor ' and by exceptions and qualifications stipu-
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lating when nations 'vould be justified in going to 'var, 
its effect would be very greatly weakened and its positive 
Yalue as a guaranty of peace virtually destroyed." · 
There 'vas much correspondence upon the objects which 
the negotiators had in vie'v, son1e of 'vhich 'vere not sus-
ceptible of consistent interpretation with propositions 
1nade from tin1e to time by the same writers. It was, 
however, clearly stated in the preliminary correspondence 
bet,veen the United States and France that the right of 
defense 'vas not impaired. The conden1nation of war 
as an instru1nent of national policy is understood " in 
other words as a means of carrying out their own spon-
taneous independent policy." 
In transmitting its adherence to the Pact of Paris, the 
l Jnion of Soviet Socialist Republics, M. Litvinoff, called 
attention to the strict interpretation of certain terms in 
the Pact. 
In considering the text of the pact the Soviet Governinen t 
deems it necessary to point to the lack of plainness and clear-
ness in article 1 of the Yery formula that forbids war, which is 
open to divergent and arbitrary interpretations. For its part, 
the Soviet Government believes that any international war ru,ust 
be forbidden either as an instrument of what is styled "na-
tional policy " or as a means to pronwte other ends (for instance 
the repression of movements for liberating peoples, etc.). In the 
opinion of the Soviet Government, it is necessary to forbid not 
only wars in a juridical and formal construction of the word 
(that is to say; assuming a "declaration of war," etc.) but also 
n1ilitary actions such as, for instance, intervention, blockade, 
"n1ilitary occupation of foreign territories, of foreign ports, etc. 
The history of these last few years records quite a number of 
military actions of that kind which have brought upon peoples 
awful calamities. (Ibid., p. 269.) 
The notes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics also 
referred to the British statement that there were 
Certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which 
constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. 
His l\iajesty's Government have been at pains to 1nake it clear 
in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suf-
fered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire 
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a measure of self-defence. It nniSt be clearly understood that 
His l\1ajesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new 
'treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice 
their freedom of action in this respect. The GoYernment of the 
United States haYe comparable interests any disregard of 'vhich 
by a foreign Po,ver they haYe declared that they would regard 
as an unfriendly act. His l\Iajesty's Government believe, there-
fore, that in defining their position they are expressing the 
intention and meaning of the United States Govern1nent. (Ibid., 
p. 45.) . 
In regard to this position, the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics said, 
If they are regions forming part of the British Empire or its 
Dominions, they are already all included in the pact, and the 
case of any aggression against them is provided for in the pact 
so that the reservation of the British Government in regard to 
them might seem to be at least superfluous. But if other regions 
are meant, the signatories of the pact have a right to know ex-
actly where the freedom of action of the British Government 
begins and where it ends. 
But the British Government reserves to itself full freedom of 
action not only in cases of armed aggression against those re-
gions but eYen in cases of any act whatsoever of enmity or "of 
interference " which would justify the British Government in 
opening hostilities. Recognition of such a right for that Gov-
ernment 'vould amount to justifying war and and might be taken 
as a contagious exan1ple to other signatories of the pact who, 
on the assu1nption that they have the sa1ne right, would also 
claim the sa1ne liberty 'vith regard to other regions, and the 
result would be that there would probably be no place left on 
earth where the pact could be put in operation. Indeed, the 
restriction n1ade by the British Government carries an invitatioiT 
to another signatory of the pact to withdra'v from its operation 
still other regi9ns. The Soviet Government can not help regard-
ing this reservation as an atte1npt to use the pact itself as an 
instrument of imperialistic policy. (Ibid., p. 271.) 
Self-defense and treaties.-It scarcely needs argun1ent 
to establish the fact that states do not negotiate a treaty 
to the end that their position in the world may be less 
favorable than when they were not parties to the treaty. 
The aim of many treaties according to their preambies 
is the maintenance of peace, the establishing o£ order and 
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justice, or n1utual aid o:f son1e sort. While there are 
so1neti1nes professions o:f ai1ning to pro1note the general 
good, it is usually in a direction closely related to the 
national good. 'fhis is particularly the case 'vhere trea-
t~es require :for their operation the approval o:f son1e 
elective. legislative body dependent upon 1najority vote. 
So1neti1nes such a body does a pproYe a treaty that seems 
innocuous if it has a :fair popular support. The san1e 
attitude is son1etin1es taken upon treaties 'vhich 1nay do 
no har1n, but possibly 1nay be of advantage. 
1\s self-defense is regarded as a funda1nental right o:f 
a state, this right 'vould be understood in no case to be 
abrogated "·ithout express proyision. Certain prerequi-
sites to the legiti1nate exercise of national forces :for self-
defense are often agreed upon such as conciliation, arbi-
tration, etc. 
lJJ arlti?ne ju1·isdiction in general.~In the Interna-
tional La,v Situations o:f the Naval \Var College of 1928 
(pp. 1-39) ~ the general subject o:f 1nariti1ne jurisdiction 
and the develop1nent o:f the la 'Y relating to 1naritin1e j u-
risdiction receiYed quite :full attention. This treatment 
sho"·ecl that there had been many differences an1ong states 
both in practice and theory and that there had been 'vide 
diYergences in the opinions of 'vriters. Controversies in 
regard to the control of the sea had been con11non :for 
1nany centuries and clai1ns to exclusi Ye control of oceans 
had often been 1nade. \Vhile :fron1 the days of Bynker-
shoek and the treaties of the early eighteenth century 
there 'vas a tendency to adopt the cannon shot, at that 
ti1ne about 3 n1iles, as the lin1it of coast jurisdiction in 
aclj a cent ".,.aters, this 'vas not unifor1nly accepted. The 
opinions of publicists, even in A1nerica, varied :fro1n tin1e 
to time. Chancellor !Cent considered that it 'vould not 
be an unreasonable asstunption :for the United States to 
clai1n 1naritime jurisdiction " :fron1 quite distant head-
lines, as, :for instance, :fron1 Cape Ann to Cape Cod, and 
:fron1 Nantucket to l\fontauk Point, a]!d fron1 that point 
to the capes o:f the Dela,vare, and :fron1 the south cape o:f 
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Florida to the Mississippi. It is certain that our Govern-
Inent 'vould. be disposed to vie'v vvith so1ne uneasiness 
and sensibility, in the case of war ·between other 1nari-
tin1e po".,.ers, the use of the waters of our coasts, far be-
yond the reach of cannon shot, as cruising ground for 
belligerent purposes." ( Com1nentaries on American 
Lavv, 14th ed., p. 26.) 
rrhere had been a considerable body of opinion in favor 
of a general acceptance of a 6-mile limit before the vVorld 
War. Since that time there has been a drift toward ac-
ceptance of a 3-Inile lin1it. as a minimun1 but recog-
nizing that there were many claims to wider jurisdiction. 
The United States Government has usually n1aintained 
the 3-Inile li1nit in recent years, though expressed 'villing-
ness to consider a wider zone. 
It no'v is settled in the United States ancl recognized elsewhere 
that the territory subject to its jurisdiction· includes the land 
areas under its don1inion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, 
and other inclosed arrris of the sea along its coast, and a marginal 
belt of the sea extending frmn the coast line out,vard a marine 
league, or 3 geographic 1niles. ( Cunarcl S.S. Co. v. jjf ellOn (1923), 
262 u.s. 100.) 
The 3-mile limit 'vas also e1nbodied in the provisions 
of the nu1nerous treaties 'vhich the United States negoti-
ated from early 1924 in regard to the s1nuggling of 
intoxicating liquors. 
Maritime jurisdiction; custo1ns.-On June 13, 1929, 
the scpooner DorotAy M. Smart when 111/2 n1iles off the 
coast of Nova Scotia was seized by a custon1s officer. 
The case was appealed and finally came to the Judicial 
Com1nittee of the Privy Council which gave judgn1ent, 
July 28, 1932. In this judgment it 'vas said, 
The validity of the seizure, which was effected in pursuance 
of po,vers conferred by the Customs Act of Canada, Revised 
Statutes of Canada, 1927, c. 42, as amended by 18 and 19 Geo. 
V., c. 16, is challenged in the present proceedings on the broad 
ground that the Parliament of the Dominion in conferring the 
powers in question exceeded its legislative comp~tence. 
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The enactments impugned are contained in sections 151 and 207 
of the statute as amended. 
Section 151 provides as follo\YS : 
"(1) If any vessel is hovering in territorial waters of Canada 
any officer may go on board such vessel and examine her cargo 
and may also exa1nine the master or person in command upon 
oath touching the cargo and voyage and bring the vessel into 
port. ... 
"(7) For the purposes of this section and section two hundred 
and seven of this Act 'Territorial waters of Canada' shall mean 
the waters fanning part of the territory of the Dominion of 
Canada and the waters adjacent to the Dominion within three 
marine n1iles thereof in case of any vessel and within twelve 
marine miles thereof in the case of any vessel registered in . 
Canada." 
Section 207 enacts as follows : 
" ( 1) If upon the examination of any officer of the cargo of any 
vessel hovering in territorial waters of Canada any dutiable, goods 
or any goods the importation of which into Canada is prohibited 
are found on board such vessel with her . . . cargo shall be 
seized and forfeited. " 
The question accordingly is whether it was within the power 
of the Dominion Parlia1nent to pass such legislation purporting 
to operate to a distance of 12 miles from the coast of Canada. 
To test this question the respondent as plaintiff below initiated 
proceedings in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia against the 
custon1s officer who had seized his vessel and cargo, clahning 
their return and dan1ages for their detention on the ground of 
the illegality of the seizure. The trial Judge upheld the validity 
of the legislation and consequently of the seizure, and his deci-
sion was affirmed by five Judges of the Supreme Court of Nova 
Scotia in banco. On an appeal being taken to the Supreme Court 
of Canada this judgment was reversed' by a majority consisting 
of l\lr. Justice Duff, l\lr. Justice Rinfret, and l\1r. Justice L!imont-
l\lr. Justice Newcon1be and l\1r. Justice Cannon dissenting. The 
rna tter now comes before their Lordships on the defendant's 
appeal. 
It 1nay be accepted as a general principle that States can 
legislate effectively only for their own territories. To what dis· 
tance seaward the territory of a State is to be taken as extend· 
ing is a question of international law upon which their Lord· 
ships do not deem it necessary or proper to pronounce. But what· 
ever be the limits of territorial waters in the international sense, 
it has long been recognized that for certain purposes, notably 
those of police, revenue, public health and fisheries, a State 1nay 
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enact laws affecting the seas surrounding its coasts to a distance 
seaward which exceeds the ordinary limits of its territory. * * * 
In the present case, ho"·eyer, there is no question of inter-
national law involYed, for legislation of the kind here challenged 
is recognized as legitilnate by international law, and in any event 
the provision impugned has no application to foreign vessels. The 
sole question is whether the Imperial Parlimnent, in conferring 
upon Canada, as it admittedly has done, full power to enact 
custmns legislation, bestowed or withheld the power to enact th~ 
provisions no'v challenged. No question of any infraction of inter· 
national law arises. * * * 
So familiar indeed are such provisions in the history of Brit-
ish custmns legislation that the series of Ineasures embodying 
then1 ha Ye con1e to be known cmnpendiously as the " Hoyering 
Acts." Although these· Acts haye now all been repealed, the 
Custon1s Consolidation Act of 1876, by section 179, authorized the 
forfeiture~ of any ship belonging 'vholly or in part to British 
subjects, or having half the persons on board subjects of her 
1\lajesty, if found with prohibited goods on board ~Yithin three 
leagues of the coast of the United I(ingdom. In the case of 
other Yessels not British the lilnit is fixed at one league from the 
Coast. (Croft v. Dunphy, July 28, 1932.) 
Straits.-rfhe "\vord "strait " has soineti11nes been used 
to describe an estuary separating t'vo land areas and 
open to the high sea only at one end. The strait here 
under consideration is bet,veen an island and coasts of 
states C and D and is a 'vater,Yay navigable and open 
to the sea at both ends. 'fhe bodies of "\Vater soinetiines 
called straits and opening to the sea at one end only have 
usually been subjected to a greater degree of control by 
the aclj a cent state or states than have straits connecting 
seas. The de1narcation of the li1nits of jurisdiction n1ay 
be in the co1npetence of the adjacent states and the na .. 
ture of the exercise of the jurisdiction may be si1nilarly 
detern1ined. 
An exa1nple of this latter type is found in the treaty 
of February 28/16, 1825, betw·een Great Britain and 
Russia in articles II and III. 
II. In order to prevent the Right of navigating and fishing 
exercised upon the Ocean by the Subjects of The High Contract-
ing Parties, from becoming the pretex for an illicit Commerce, 
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it is agreed that the Subjects of His Britannick l\1ajesty shall 
not land at any place where there may be a Russian Establish-
ment, without the permission of the Governor or Co·mmandant; 
and, on the other hand, that Russian Subjects shall not land, 
'vithout permission, at any British Establishment on the North-
'Vest Coast. 
III. The line of dernarcation between the Possessions of the 
High Contracting Parties, upon the Coast of the Continent, and 
the Islands of Am·erica to the North-,Vest, shall be drawn in the 
manner following :-
Conunencing fron1 the Southernmost Point of the Island called 
Prince of vVales Island, which Point lies in the parallel of 54 
degrees 40 Ininutes Nortp_ latitude, and between the 13lst and 133d 
degree of 'Vest longitude (l\1eridian of Greenwich), the said line 
shall ascend to the North along the Channel called Portland 
Chctnnel, as far as the Point of the Continent where it strikes the 
56th degree of North latitude; fron1 this last-mentioned Point, the 
line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains 
situated parallel to the Coast, as far as the point of intersection 
of the 141st degree of 'Vest longitude (of the sa1ne l\1eridian) ; 
and, finally, fron1 the said l\1eridian Line of the 141st degree, in 
its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the 
limit between the Russian and British Possessions on the Conti-
nent of America to the North-,Vest. (12 Briti~h and Foreign 
State Papers, p. 38.) 
This treaty subsequently beca1ne of importance to the 
United States as successor to Russia in this region. 
Another boundary involving a strip of water running 
inland bet,veen t'vo states 'vas on the north,vest frontier 
of the United States and in the treaty of June 15, 1846, 
it vvas stated, 
ARTIOLE 1. Fr01n the point on the 49,th parallel of north la ti-
tude, where· the boundary laid clown in existing treaties. and con-
Yentions between the United States and Great Britain termi-
nates, the line of boundary between the territories of the United 
States and those of her Britannic Majesty shall be continued 
westward along the said 49th parallel of north latitude to the 
middle of the channel which separates the continent from Van~ 
couver's Island, and thence southerly through the n1iddle of the 
said channel, and of Fuca's Straits, to the Pacific Ocean;-
Prov·ided, however, That the navigation of the whole of the said 
channel and straits, south of the 49th parallel of north latitude, 
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shall re1nain free and open to both parties. (9 U.S. Stat. p. 
869.) 
The Fuca's Straits here mentioned at the entrance near 
Bonilla Point are somewhat more than 10 1niles \vide 
and at points within much \vider, but a boundary cover-
ing these waters was accepted by the United States and 
Great Britain in 1873 in accord with an arbitral a ward 
of the German E1nperor. 
Jurisdiction over st1·aits.-During the latter half of 
the nineteenth century there \Vas a considerable drift 
t o\vard \videning the generally accepted area o:£ juris-
diction of the sea. This tendency \vould also extend 
to jurisdiction over straits. .._L\._fter 1nuch discussion the 
Institute of International Law at its sessions in 1891, 
1892, and 1894, gave attention to the question of defini-
tion and status of the territorial sea and in 1894 adopted 
the following: 
ARTICLE 10. The provisions of the preceding articles apply to 
straits whose breadth does not exceed twelve· miles, subject to 
the following modifications and distinctions: 
1. Straits whose shores belong to different States fonn part 
of the territorial sea of the littoral States, which will exercise 
their sovereignty to the n1iddle line. 
2. Straits whose shores belong to the sa1ne State and which 
a re indispensable to 1naritin1e con1munication between two or 
more States other than the littoral State always forn1 part of 
the territorial sea of such State, whatever the distance between 
the coasts. 
3, Straits which serve as a passage from one open sea to 
another open sea can never be closed. 
ARTICLE! 11. The n3ginte of straits actually goYerned by special 
conventions or usages re1nains reserved, (Resolutions of the In-
stitute of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace, p. 115.) 
As the 6-Inile limit :for jurisdiction over the territorial 
sea was not generally accepted, the tendency has been to 
accept the principles of article 10 \Vith the substitution 
o:£ 6 in place of 12 miles. 
Black Sea Straits.-Since late in the eighteenth cen-
tury the passage fro1n the l\1editerranean to the Black 
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Sea has becon1e an international question of capital iin-
portance. During the years ·when the whole coast line 
of the Black Sea and its entrances 'vas under the juris-
diction of Turkey, there was little discussion of inter-
national rights. ''rhen Russia by treaty in 1774 ob-
tained ri ahts of passage through the Dardanelles and 
b . 
Bosphorns for Russian vessels of con1n1erce, ne'v prob-
l~Ins arose and the " Straits question " as it caine to be 
called became a European problen1. During the N a pole-
onic \Vars the passage of vessels of 'var gave rise to con-
troYersy and during the nineteenth century the degree 
of control of the Straits varied 'vith the national rela-
tj ons. The United States did not forn1ally ad1nit the 
rjght to close these 'vaters. Questions arose in regard to 
the passage of the Russian volunteer fleet vessels, par-
ticularly the Smolensk and Peterbwrg, during the Russo-
Japanese \Var, 1904-05. (1906 Naval 'Var College, In-
ternational Law Topics, p. 119; 1907 Naval \Var College, 
International La 'v Situations, pp. 48-50; 1912 Ibid., p. 
171.) Other proble1ns arose 'vhen the Breslau and 
Goeben, Gern1an cruisers, sought refuge fron1 the allied 
forces by entering the Straits. 
In the T'reaty of Sevres, August 10, 1921, bet,veen 
the Principal Allied Pow·ers and Turkey, provisions 
'vere 1nade in section II of part III for navigation and 
control of the straits. Article 37 stated that, 
The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the 
Sea of l\larmora and the Bosphorus, sball in future be open, 
both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of war 
and to 1nilitary and commercial aircraft, without distinction 
of flag. 
These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor shall any 
belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be com-
n1itted within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the 
Council of the League of Nations. 
Article 38 and following articles delegated control to 
a " com1nission of the straits " and outlined the Inethod 
of control. This Treaty of Sevres gave to Greece a 
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1neasure of control of the European shore of the Dar-
danelles and in this and other respects 'vas unacceptable 
to ~'urkey and after further negotiations, Turkey taking 
advantage of the troubles of the Allied Pow·ers, W'as 
able to make more favorable tern1s at the Lausanne Con-
ference in 1923. In the Convention relating to the Re-
giine of the Straits signed at. Lausanne, July 24-, 1023, 
Turkey obtained modification of p1any of the detailed 
restrictions of the unratified Treaty of Sevres as vvell 
as control of the European coast of the Dardanelles, 
though " rrhe princi pie of freedon1 of transit and of 
navigation by sea and by air, in tin1e of peace as in 
ti1ne of 'var, in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea 
of ~iar1nora and the Bosphorus " is recognized in article 
23 of the treaty 'vhich the convention elaborates. 
Straits of 111 agellan.-Spain fro1n 1520 held authority 
over the southern portion of South America and juris-
diction over the Straits of ~Iagellan. Spain atte1npted 
to fortify the strait and for a tin1e to close it to naviga-
tion. The establishing of the independence of the Argen-
tine Republic and of Chile introduced ne'v problen1s re-
lating to the jurisdiction and navigation of these straits. 
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
right of states adjacent to the Straits of Magellan to close 
that strait has ordinarily been denied. The Straits of 
~fagellan afford a n1uch n1ore convenient and safer route 
for vessels passing fro1n the so~thern Atlantic to the 
southern Pacific Ocean than the route by open sea. 
These straits for about 300 1niles furnish an inland ""'ater-
'vay fro1n 2 to 1nore than 10 n1iles in 'vidth. Part of this 
'vater,vay is 'vholly 'vithin the jurisdictional area clai1ned 
by Chile and part is bet"~een Chile and the Argentine 
Republic. There has been much controversy bet"reen the 
t'vo states over their respective territorial liinits. 
By the treaty bet,veen the Argentine Republic and 
Chile signed July 23, 1881, it 'vas provided-
ARTICLE 5. The Strait of :\Iagellan is neutralized. and free navi-
gation thereon insured to the flags of all nations. With a view 
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to guaranteeing this freedom and neutrality, no fortification or 
military defenses will be raised that may clash with that object. 
(72 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 1103.) 
Decrees of Chile, 1914.-The status of Chilean terri-
torial 'vaters and the Straits of ~1agellan so far as Chile 
'vas concerned 'vas defined in t'vo decrees in 1914. 
No. 1857. 
l\1INISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
SANTIAGo, Novernber 5, 1914. 
Considering that, although it is true that the laws of the Re-
public have determined the lilnits of the territorial sea and of the 
national domain, and the distance. to which extend the rights of 
11olice in all matters concerning the security of the country and 
the observance of customs laws, they have not fixed the maritime 
zone in reference to the safeguarding of the rights and the ac-
complishnlent of the duties relative to the neutrality declared by 
the Government in case of international conflicts; and that it is 
proper for sovereign states to fix this zone. 
It is decreed: 
The contiguous sea, up to a distance of 3 marine miles counted 
from the low-water line is considered as the jurisdictional or 
neutral sea on the coasts of the Republic for the safeguarding of 
the rights and the accomplishment of the duties relative to the 
neutrality declared by the Government in case of international 
conflicts. 
Let it be noted, comn1unicated, published, and inserted in the 
Bulletin of the Laws and Decrees of the Government. 
BARRos Luco. 
l\IANUEL SALINAS. 
(1916 Naval War College, International Law Topics, p. 19.) 
No. 1986. 
Considering that the Strait of l\lagellan as wel1 as the canals 
of the southern region lie within the international limits of Chile, 
and consequently fonn part of the territory of the Republic, 
It is decreed: 
In reference to the neutrality established in the decree No. 1857 
of Nove1nber 5 last of the ministry of foreign affairs, the interior 
waters of the Strait of l\1ageUan and the canals of the southern 
region, even in the parts which are distant more than 3 miles from 
either bank, should be considered as forming part of the juris-
dictional or neutral sea. 
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Let lt be noted, comn1unicated, published, and inserted in the 
Bulletin of the Laws and Decrees of the Government. 
(Ibid, p. 21.) 
BARROS LUCO. 
l\lANUEL SALIN AS. 
League of Nations 0 onwnittee and straits.-On Sep-
telnber 22, 1924, thP. Asse1nbly of the League of N a-
tions requested the Council to convene a committee o£ 
experts to consult and report to the Council upon what 
questions were sufficiently ripe :for consideratio!i with 
view to a progressive codification o£ international law. 
Among subjects regarded as fitted for an international 
cen:ference was territorial waters. This con1n1ittee o£ ex-
perts adopted a plan for a questionnaire to be submitted 
to the various states with the purpose of determining 
"~hat should be the course of their labors. From this 
questionnaire n1atters relating to private international 
law, the law o£ war and o£ neutrality were in general ex-
cluded. In the report of the subcommittee-Messrs. 
Schiicking, de Magalhaes, and Wickersham-having to 
do with territorial waters, Mr. Schiicking's first draft 
provided in article 6: 
The regime of straits at present subject to special conventions 
is reserved. 
In Straits of which both shores belong to the same State, the 
sea shall be territorial, even jf the distance between the shores 
exceeds 12 miles, provided that that distance is not exceeded at 
either entrance to the strait. 
Straits not exceeding 12 miles in width whose shores belong 
to different States shall form part of the territorial sea as far 
as the middle line. (20 An1er. Journ. International Law, Sup-
plement [1926], p. 117.) 
This was not approved by the subcomn1ittee. In coln-
menting on this rule, Dr. Schiicking remarked: 
The legal view most generally favoured fixes as the limit the 
1niddle of the strait. 
A rule of law not without practical importance which has been 
established as regards rights in straits serving as a passage to 
open seas is that such a strait may never be closed. This rule 
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is in accordance with the idea that a riparian State is not 
entitled in time of war completely to close its territorial sea. 
(Ibid., p. 89.) 
Nlr. Wickersham in referring to Dr. Schiicking's atti-
tude on straits said, 
If the strait be n1ore than six miles in width and the land 
on either side is O\Vned by a diffeTent State, the general rule 
is that the boundary line runs through the middle of the strea1n. 
If, on the other hand, the stream be less than six 1niles in width, 
the principle of thalweg would ordinal'ily apply; although the 
rule is not uniforn1 (see Hall, pp. 1H5-6 ; Lawrence, 140 ; Crocker, 
281). If the shores of a strait on both sides are owned by one 
nation but the strait connects waters the opposite banks of which 
nre owned by different Powers, the strait constitutes a maritime 
'· high"·ay which may not be closed by the proprietor State (Ray-
neval, InstUutions d'lt Droit de · la Nat'ltre, I, p. 298), e.g. the 
Baltic, the Dardanelles. (Ibid., p. 140.) 
1"he draft convention as amended by Dr. Schiicking 
in consequence of discussion by the committee of experts 
contained the follo,ving article in regard to straits : 
ARTICLE 6. The regime of straits at present subject to special 
conventions is reserved. In straits of which both shores belong 
to the same State, the sea shall be territorial, even if the distance 
behveen the shores exceeds ten miles, p1·ovided that that distance 
is not exceeded at either entrance to the strait. 
Straits not exceeding ten miles in width whose shores belong 
to different States shall form part of the territorial sea as far as 
the middle line. (Ibid., p. 142.) 
Comments on proposed article 6.-In the preli1ninary 
replies there was a Wide diversity of opinion among states 
upon the amended article 6 of the League of Nations 
Committee which proposed a 10-mile limit for straits. 
Germany commented to , the following effect: 
An ARTICLE 6.-If the th1·ee-nautical-mile zone is taken as a 
basis, the legal status of straits should depend solely on whether 
their width at the entrance is over or under six nautical miles, 
as the case may be. (League of Nations. C. 196. M. 70. 1927 
v. p. 131.) 
International Law Association, 19.~6.-The Interna-
tional Law Association which had considered the ques-
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tion and prepared a draft convention on the law of mari-
time jurisdiction in ti1ne of peace embodied in this 
convention in 1926 the following articles: 
IV. STRAIT'S AND NATURAL CHANNELS CoNNEC'I'ING Two SEAS 
ART'ICILE 14 
In the case of straits and natural channels which connect two 
or more seas and \Vhich divide two or more States, the limit of 
the territorial jurisdiction of each State shall be the middle line 
of the strait or channel which divides them, when the· strait or 
channel is six 1niles or less in width. 
ARTICLE 15 
Where a strait or channel is more than six miles in \Vidth, 
the right of territorial jurisdiction of the littoral States extends 
to three miles from their respective coasts; oeyond this limit its 
status is the same as on the high sea. 
ARTIOLE 16 
"\Vhen the power to make transit regulations is not vested in 
an international body, the regulations enacted by the littoral 
States shall, as far as possible, be unifonn and such as not to 
interfere with freedom of navigation. (Report, 34th Conference, 
192:6,, p. 101.) 
Japanese Branch of the International Law' Associa-
tion.-The Japanese Branch of the International Law 
Association in 1926 accepted as the limit of the marginal 
sea the 3-Inile line from the lo·w-'vater mark and the 10-
Inile line for mouths of bays wholly bounded by one 
State. The draft prepared by the Japanese branch also 
had an article relating to straits as follows: 
ARTIOLm 3. If, in the case of straits the coasts of \vhich belong 
to the same State, the distance between the shores of each en-
trance does not exceed ten 1narine miles, the littoral \Vaters 
extend outwards at right angles from the straight lines respec-
tively dra\vn across each entrance of the straits at the first 
points nearest the open sea where the width does not exceed ten 
marine 1niles. 
In the case of straits the coasts of which belong to two or more 
different States, the littoral \Vaters follow the trend of the coasts 
according to the general rule; but in case the distance between 
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the two shores does not amount to six marine miles, the dividing 
line between the respective littoral waters shall in principle be 
the 1niddle line measured from the two coasts. (25 Revue de 
Droit International et Diploma tie [Tokio], July, 19'26.) 
Closure of ports.-Certain aspects of the closure of 
ports \vere considered in the Naval War College Inter-
national La\v Situations, 1930, under situation II. It 
\Vas shown that ports were for various reasons closed 
for periods in tin1e of peace and by effective blockade in 
time of \var. 
In l\1ay 1910, instructions had been issued in regard 
to interference \vith shipping off the coast of Nicaragua: 
"'The Secretary of State then held that if the announced block-
ade or inve.stinent was effectively maintained, and the require-
ments of international law, including warning to approaching 
vessels, were observed, the United States Government would not 
be disposed to prevent its enforce1nent, but reserved all rights in 
respect to the validity of any proceedings against vessels as 
prizes of war. In the present instance it should, however, be ob-
sen·ed that a vessel which, by deceiving the authorities at a port 
of the United States, sailed therefroin in the guise of a Iner-
ehanhnan, but had in reality been destined for use as a war vessel, 
by such act has forfeited full belligerent rights, such as the right 
of search on the high seas and of blockade.' Also the letter of the 
Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy as of June 3, 
regarding a proposed instruction to Commander Gilmer, which 
instruction was also given: ' This Govern1nent denies the right. 
of either faction to seize American-owned vessels or property 
without consent of and recompense to the owners. In such cases, 
if you can ascertain ownership, you will instantly act in ac-
cordance with this policy.' And the letter from the Secretary 
of the Navy to the Secretary of State of June 7, containing the 
notifications issued by Commander Gilmer under date of June 
3: ' I received a con1'munication to-day from Gen. Rivas, com-
manding l\Iadriz forces, Bluefields Bluff, stating that certain 
vessels have been used by Estrada forces and that he would not 
permit vessels of Bluefield Steamship Co., Atlantic Navigation 
Co., Bellanger Co., and Cukra Co., all American companies, to 
pass through the waters held by Madriz forces. I informed him 
that Estrada had the right to use these vessels with consent of 
owners if properly re1nunerated, but while so used Rivas had 
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the right to capture or destroy them; but when in the company's 
legitimate trade I would pennit no interference with them. I 
have ordered guard An1erican n1arines or sailors on vessels pass-
ing Bluff when in legitin1ate trade. Have inforlli'ecl Rivas that. 
if they were fired upon I would return the fire and would seize 
the Venus and Sa!Jt Jaointo, and that I would permit no inter-
ference with shipping of American finns in legitimate business.',. 
( 1910 U.S. Foreign Relations, p. 756.) 
It has been admitted that a state may act :for its o'vn 
de:fense by closing its ports in 'vhole or in part. 
Closure of straits.-There n1ay be a difference of 
opinion as to closing a strait which is a high,vay :for coJn-
merce. I:£ a strait is the sole high,vay :for commerce be-
t,veen t'vo open seas, it has been generally maintained 
since the middle o:f the nineteenth century that it 1nay not 
be closed as this 'vould constitute a denial o:f the :freedon1 
o:f the sea. This position does not necessarily deny to a 
state adjacent to the strait the right to take 'vithin its. 
o'vn jurisdiction measures essential to a reasonable de-
gree o:f protection :for itsel:f. These: 1neasures should,. 
ho,vever, be restricted both in tilne and in character to. 
action that 'vould constitute the Ininin1un1 degree of 
inter:ference with innocent passage. 
The Declaration o:f France and Great Britain, April 
8, 1904, respecting Egypt and lVIorocco in article \ 7II 
provides :for the :free passage o:f the Straits o:f Gibraltar· 
as :follo-ws: · 
In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar,. 
the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that por-
tion of the coast of l\lorocco comprised between, but not includ-. 
ing, 1\lelilla and the heights whkh command the right bank ot 
the River Sebon. 
This condition does not, however, apply to the places at present 
in the occupation of Spain on the l\loorish coast of the l\lediter-
ranean. (32 l\1artens, TraitE~s Generales, Noveau Recueille, 2d 
ser., 1905, pp. 15, 20.) 
Declaration of w1ar.-Fro1n early Biblical times there 
was usually a considerable degree o:f :for1nality in insti·-
tuting 'var measures. Formal announcements and re-
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plies 'vere com1non. The Greeks and Romans made 
declarations and at ti1nes prescribed a period between 
declaration and active hostilities during 'vhich satisfac-
tion n1ight be 1nade. The sending of heralds, the issuing 
of ulti1nata, periods of grace, challenges, etc., in vary-
ing forn1s continued to be used till the late seventeenth 
century. 
'Vith extension of overseas territories and the develop-
Inent of maritin1e activity, practice beca1ne less strict and 
e1nbargoes, letters of 1narque and reprisal indicated 
changed attitudes. During the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries the greater number of wars 'vere car-
ried on and concluded 'vithout declaration. Many coin-
plications and uncertainties arose in consequence of this 
change and the staten1ent of the Court in the case of the 
Buena V erdu1'a set forth the situation as of 1899 : 
The practice of a formal proclamation before recognizing an 
exi~ting war and capturing ene1ny's property has fallen into dis-
use in modern thnes, and actual hostilities may determine the 
date of the coHnnencement of \Var, though no proclaination Inay 
haYe been issued, no declaration n1ade, and no action of the 
legislative branch of the government had. ( 87 Feel. n2:7; 175 
u_.s. 384.) 
The uncertainty of the time at which 'var com1nenced 
gave rise to 1nany difficulties as the relations of belliger-
ents and of neutrals changed. Intricate legal problen1s 
arose as to rights of capture, transfer of titles, and other 
relations con1n1on in modern relations among states and 
an1ong their citizens. Accusations of treachery and 
1nany forn1s of misconduct had arisen in recent years 
because of resort to war without previous declaration. 
In 1906 the Institute of International Law had after 
full discussion aclopt€d the following resolutions: 
1. It. is in accordance with the requirements of international 
law, and with the spirit of fairness which nations owe to one 
another in their n1utual relations, as well as in the con1mon in-
terest of all States, that hostilities n1ust not commence without 
previous and explicit \Yarning. 
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2,. This warning 1nny take vlace either under the fonn of a 
declaration of war 11ure and shnple, or under that of an ultima-
tum, duly notified to the adversary by the State about to coin-
mence war . 
. 3. Hostilities shall not commence before the expiration of a 
delay sufficient to n1ake it certain that the rule of previous and 
explicit notice cannot be considered as evaded. (Scott, Resolu-
tions of the Institute of International Law, p. 164.) 
At the Second Hague Peace Conference, 1907, a some-
w·hat 1nore satisfactory for1n 'vas adopted which gave a 
sanction to the requirement of a declaration by exen1pt-
ing neutrals fron1 liability unless the state of war should 
be 1nade kno,vn. Hague Convention III relative to the 
Coininenceinent of Hostilities took the following forn1 : 
ARTICLE 1. The contracting powers recognize that hostilities 
between then1selves n1ust not c01nmence without previous and 
explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of 
war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. 
This convention 'vas generally ratified. 
Reasons for declaring war.-The first article of Hague 
Convention III, Co1nmencen1ent of Hostilities, had pro-
vided for a declaration with reasons and reasons 'vere 
given in the n1ore than 50 declarations issued in th~ 
'Vorld 'Var. These reasons included acts of aggression, 
cooperation 'vith enen1y, alliance with ene1ny, violation 
of treaties, subversive intrigues, violation of neutral 
rights, con1mon cause \Yith de1nocratic nations, fulfill-
Inent of national aspirations, defense of navigation of 
the seas, and 1nany others both concrete and abstract. 
Brazilian rules, 1933.-Subsequent to the submission of 
this situation for consideration at the Naval 'Var College, 
the Paraguayan Republic on Nlay 10, 1933, declared a 
state of 'var 'vith Bolivia. Argentina, May 13, 1933; 
Brazil, May 23, 1933; Chile, May 13, 1933; Peru, May 13, 
1933; and Uruguay, May 12, 1933, declared neutrality. 
Brazil has usually issued detailed rules in regard to neu-
trality. 0"wing to the geographical situation of Bolivia 
and Paraguay as states with no seacoast but with river 
connections to the sea through neu~ral states, questions as 
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to communication and trade became important. Brazil 
aimed to maintain its neutrality by specific articles in its 
rules o:f neutrality such as-
ARTICLE 3. The agents of the Federal Governn1ent or of the 
States of Brazil are forbidden to export or to favor directly or 
indirectly the remittance of war material to either of the 
belligerents. 
ARTICLE 4. The provision of the preceding article does not pre-
vent the free transit, river or land, assured by treaties in effect 
between Brazil and either of the belligerents. 
ARTICLE 5. It is forbidden to the belligerents to make on the 
land, river, or maritime territory of the United States of Brazil, 
a base of war operations or to practice acts \Vhich may constitute 
a violation of Brazilian neutrality. 
Opening of hostilities.-The representatives o:f the 
states asse1nbled at the Second Peace Conference at The 
Hague in 1907 in Conventions II and III distinguished 
bet\Yeen " recourse to armed :force " [recours a la force 
arn1ee] and " hostilities " [les hostilites]. In Convention 
II the po\vers state their desire to avoid " arn1ed conflicts 
o:f a pecuniary origin ", while the preamble o:f Conven-
tion III states that the Contracting Powers 
Considering that it is important, in order to ensure the main-
tenance of pacific relations, that hostilities should not commence 
without previous warning; 
That it is equally important that the existence of a state of war 
should be notified without delay to neutral Powers; 
have agreed upon the :following articles. 
Before 1907 some writers had maintained that there 
was some sort o:f " political morality " which should be 
observed by states obliging them to make it publicly 
kno\vn be :fore engaging in war. There \Vas, however, be-
fore 1907 no legal obligation to make a declaration be-
fore engaging in hostilities and the legality o:f war with-
out declaration was admitted in practice and by the 
courts. Evidence o:f the confusion which such a position 
n1ay entail may be seen in the early stages o:f the Russo-
Japanese war, 1904, as \vell as the Spanish-An1erica war, 
96 STRAITS IN PEACE AND WAR 
1898. \Vith these £acts in mind, the delegates at The 
Hague in 1907 hoped to and did, take a step to,vard peace 
by defining the conditions essential to the legal opening 
o£ hostilities. 
The experience o£ states o£ the world since 1907 would 
see1n to be sufficient to prove the legal value o£ a conven-
tion 'vhich would fix the time o£ and prerequisites £or the 
opening o£ hostilities. The demarcation o£ the line be-
t-ween the use o£ force in time o£ peace and the hostile 
use o£ force in time o£ war should not be left uncertain. 
Frequently the use o£ force in time o:f peace has brought 
about conditions that have 1nade "\Var unnecessary. 
\Vithout the demarcation o£ a line bet,veen peace and 
war, uncertainty as to the rights o£ the parties using 
force as 'veil as o£ third parties prevails. Other con-
ventions o£ the Hague Conference o£ 1907 rest upon the 
Convention Relating to the Opening o£ Hostilities. The 
discussions at the Hague in 1907 give an1ple evidence o£ 
the distinction between the idea o£ the resort to the use 
o£ force and the resort to war. The parties signing and 
ratifying the Hague Convention acted 'vith clear under-
standing upon this matter and much o£ the recent con-
fusion is due to writing and discussion that £ails to 1nake 
the legally established distinction 'vhich has prevailed 
since 1907. So1ne o£ these writers have based their con-
clusions upon eighteenth and nineteenth century prac-
tice and decisions from some o£ the unfortunate con-
sequences o£ 'vhich the efforts o£ 1907 aiinecl to escape. 
Others have argued in a fashion implying that the Cove-
nant o£ the League o£ Nations superseded all existing 
treaties and established a ne'v vocabulary £or interna-
tional law and new principles £or interpretation o£ 
treaties. Such 1nethods discredit their conclusions and 
'veaken confidence in the Covenant o£ the League. The 
Hague Convention o£ 1907, not dra,vn up at a ti1ne of 
exceptional international stress, ai1ned to take steps to-
'vard the Inaintenance o£ peace in the 'vorld on the basis 
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'Of respect for law·, and no state or states were under 
compulsion to affix their signatures or to accept the con-
ventions. The Inethod of procedure in relation to the 
opening of hostilities 1nay in brief su1nmary sho'v this. 
llfaking IIag1te Convention III, 1907.-Before draw-
ing up the Convention Relative to the Opening of Hos-
tilities at The Hague, 1907, a questionnaire 'vas prepared 
by the President of the subcon1mission to which the topic 
'vas con1111itted for presentation. This questionnaire was 
.as follo,vs: 
1. Is it desirable to establish an international understanding 
relatiYe to the opening of hostilities? 
(On the supposition of an affinna tive response to this ques-
tion:) 
2. Is it best to require that the opening of hostilities be pre-
-ceded by a declaration of war or an equivalent act? 
3. Is it best to fix upon a time which 1nust elapse between the 
notification of such an act and the opening of hostilities? 
4. Should it be stipulated that the declaration of war or equiv-
-alent act to be notified to neutrals? 
And by whmn? 
5. 'Vhat should be the consequences of a failure to observe 
the preceding rules? 
6. 'Vhat is the diplomatic forn1 in which it is best to set out 
the understanding? (III Proceedings of the Hague Peace 
Conference, Carnegie Endow1nent translation, p. 253.) 
The first question 'vas answered by a unanimous 
.affirmative. There 'vas, however, discussion as to 
whether there should be a requirement of a definite pe-
riod bet,veen the declaration and the first act of hostili-
ties. The Institute of International Law at its meeting 
in 1906 had been unable to agree that there should be a 
specified interval bet,veen the declaration and the act 
of hostilities. Since the state of war affects not merely 
the relations between the belligerents but also between 
belligerents and neutrals, it was pointed out in the dis-
cussions that this change should be made kno,vn to neu-
trals and in order that this 1night be done, the Conven-
tion provided in article .2 that: 
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The state of war must be notified to the neutral powers with-
out delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until after 
the receipt of a notification, which may even be given by tele-
graph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not plend the absence 
of notification if it is established beyond doubt that they were in 
fact aware of the state of war. 
Both in the preamble and in the articles of this Hague 
Convention III, the distinction between hostilities and a 
state of war is recognized. There might be a state of 
war without any hostilities or conflict of the armed pub-
lic forces. The neutral rights and obligations arose from 
a known state of war regardless of whether any hostili-
ties had or had not taken place. 
Many of the other conventions drawn up at The 
Hague in 1907 presuppose the existence of a requirement 
making a declaration of war necessary, e.g., to determine 
days of grace, to determine right to convert merchant 
vessels into vessels of war, etc. 
Radio in time of peaee.-The use of radio in time of 
peace has been regulated by successive conferences during 
the twentieth century. Each conference has had new 
problems before it as the use and possibilities of use of 
radio have been extended. Several of the most recent 
conferences have been mainly concerned with details 
often of a highly technical character. Regulations for 
standardized wave lengths, etc., have been found essential 
for effectivity of radio communication. It has been 
clearly recognized that international cooperation is es-
sential and at the same time the greatest possible national 
freedom is desirable. This is evident in the work of the 
conferences of Berlin (1906), and London (1912), "'\Vash-
ington (1927), and Madrid (1932). In the time of peace 
the use of radio which is not in contravention to the 
agreements under the international conventions is wholly 
a 1natter of control of the authority 'vithin whose juris-
diction the station may be and under the convention 
states parties to the terms undertake to enforce pro-
visions of the articles. No control of stations outside na-
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tional jurisdiction is conferred though agreements are 
made as to their operation. A station upon a merchant 
vessel on the high sea in time o:f peace would, therefore, 
be under the jurisdiction o:f the flag which the vessel law-
fully flies. When a vessel flying the flag o:f one state is 
within the territorial waters o:f another state, it is gener-
ally accepted that :for acts which take effect outside the 
vessel the state within "\vhose waters a vessel is may 
regulate the action o:f the vessel. 
Radio in w'ar.-The regulation o:f radio in time o:f war 
has received consideration at the Naval War College 
:from time to time since 1907. (See General Index, 1901-
:30.) The conclusion :from these discussions and :from the 
practice in the World War may be summarized in article 
2 o:f the Report of the Committee o:f Jurists: 
Belligerent and neutral Powers may regulate or prohibit the 
'()peration of_radio stations within their jurisdiction. (1924 Naval 
'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 100.) 
lJfine laying.-The use o:f mines has long been a subject 
'Of differing opinion. Many regarded mines as embody-
ing an unseen menace which should be prohibited, but 
as in the case o:f torpedoes and other modern means o:f 
warfare such objections have received relatively little 
attention other than to lead to the :formulating o:f rules 
against mine laying involving unnecessary risk to non-
·combatants and neutrals. The use o:f mines during the 
Russo-Japanese war 1904-05 brought the matter to the 
attention o:f states just be-fore the Hague Peace Confer-
ence o:f 1907, and that conference drafted a convention 
upon the subject of submarine mines. This convention 
provided: 
ARTICLE 1. 
It is forbidden: 
1. To lay unanchored automatic contact m1nes, except when 
they are so constructed as to become harmless one hour at 1nost 
after those who laid them cease to control them; 
2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not be-
come harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moor-
ings; 
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3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they 
have. missed their mark. 
ARTICILE 2. 
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the coast 
and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting com-
nlercial shipping. 
ARTICLE 3. 
Wtcn anchored automatic contact 1nines are en1ployed, every 
possible precaution n1ust be taken for the security of peaceful 
shipping. 
The belligerents undertake to do their utmost to render these 
n1ines hannless ·within a limited time, and, should they cease to 
be under surveillance, to notify the danger zones soon as mili-
tary exigencies, permit, by a notice addressed to shipowners, 
'Yhich must also be communieated to the Governments through 
the diplomatic channel. 
ARTICLE 4. 
Neutral powers which lay automatic contact mines off its coasts 
must observe the same rules and take the sa1ne precautions as 
are imposed on belligerents. 
The neutral Power must inform ship-owners, by a notice issued 
in advance, 'vhere autmnatic contact mines have been laid. This 
notice must be communicated at once to the Governments through 
the diplomatic channel. (36 U.S. Statutes, pp. 2332, 2343.) 
A somewhat extended discussion of these and other 
articles of Hague Convention VIII relative to the laying 
of automatic· contact submarine mines 1na.y be. found in 
topic IV, pp. 100-138, of Naval War College, Interna-
tional La'v Topics and Discussions, 1914. 
lJf in.es in W orlcl W ar.-Mines had been found useful 
in the Russo-Japanese and other wars and were used 
early in the World vVar. The American A1nba~sador at 
Berlin telegraphed to the Secretary of State on August 
7, 1914: 
The Foreign Office has the honor to infol'ln the Embassy of 
the United States of A1nerica that during the state of war in 
which the German Empire now finds itself, the necessity 'vill 
arise, according to prospects, of blockading with n1ines the points 
of departure for attacks on the part of hostile fleets against 
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Germany, and the ports of shipment, departing and arriving, of 
troop transport. 
The Foreign Office begs the United States Embassy to bring 
this to the knowlodge of its Government as soon as possible in 
order that shipping may be warned in due tin1e against entering 
harbors and roadsteads which may serve as bases for the hostile 
forces. (1914 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 454, note 2.) 
'l'he Secretary of State on August 10 asked the Ameri-
can Ambassador in Great Britain if there was any foun-
dation for the report that belligerents \Yere scattering 
contact 1nines in the Channel. On the follo\ving clay a 
reply \Yas received, 
The naYal attache is assured by Admiralty officials that Admir-
alty haYe not laid and will not lay mines in navigable waters 
excerlt at entrance of ports they wish to defend. Sir Edward 
Grey tells me that Germany has been laying contact mines in the 
North Sea. The German rnine-laying ship J(onigen Lui.se, recently 
llestroyed by H.l\I.S. Amphion, was engaged in laying a line of 
contnct rnines to extend across the North Sea. (Ibid, p. 455.) 
On the Saine day the British Charge in vV ashington 
presented to the Se-cretary of State a copy of a telegran1 
he had received the evening before from the Foreign 
Office, as follows: 
The Germans are scattering contact mines indiscrilninately about 
the North Sea in the open sea without regard to the consequences 
to merchantmen. Two clays ago four large n1erchant ships were 
o bserYed to pass within a n1ile of the mine field which sank 
H.l\I.S. Antph.ion. The waters of the North Sea must therefore be 
regarded as perilous in the last degree to merchant shipping of 
all nations. In view of the methods adopted by. Germany the 
British Admiralty must hold themselves fully at liberty to adopt 
similar measures in self-clffiense which must inevitably increase 
the dangers to navigation in the North Sea. But, before doing 
so, they think it right to issue this warning in order that Iner-
chant ships under neutral flags trading with North Sea ports 
should be turned back before entering the area of such exceptional 
danger. (Ibid.) 
"\Vhile taking note of this com1nunication and calling 
attention to the obligations under article 1 of VIII 
Hague Convention, 1907, the reply of August 13, said: 
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The Secretary of State is loath to believe that a signatory to 
that convention would wilfully disregard its treaty obligation, 
which was manifestly made in the interest of neutral shipping. 
All restrictions upon the rights of neutrals upon the high seas, 
the common highway of nations, during the progress of a 'var, 
are permitted in the interests of the belligerents, who are bound 
in return to prevent their hostile operations from increasing the 
hazard of neutral ships in the open sea so far as the exigencies 
of the war permit. 
If an ene1ny of His l\fajesty's Government has, as asserted, 
endangered neutral commerce by an act in violation of the Hague 
convention, which can not be justified on the ground of military 
necessity, the Secretary of State perceives no reason for His 
l\fajesty's Government adopting a similar course, which would 
add further dangers to the peaceful navigation of the high seas by 
'essels of neutral powers. 
The Secretary of State, therefore, expresses the earnest and 
confident hope that His Majesty's Government may not feel com-
pelled to resort, as a defensive ~easure, to a method of naval 
warfare, which would appear to be contrary to the terms of the 
Hague convention and impose upon the ships and lives of neutrals 
a needless 1nenace when peaceably navigating the high seas. 
(Ibid, p. 456.) 
On August 19 another com1nunication from the British 
Charge thre"\v down the argument for neutral obligation 
"\vhich was later often brought forward by the belliger-
ents, 
His Majesty's Government share the reluctance of the Secre-
tary of State to see the practice extended and the danger to 
neutral shipping increased. At the same tin1e His l\fajesty's 
Char~e d'Affairs is instructed to point out that if Great Britain 
refrains from adopting the methods of Germany, the result is 
that Gern1any receives immunity unless the neutral poweTs can 
find some means of making Germany feel that she cannot con-
tinue to preserve all facilities for receiving trade and supplies 
through neutral shipping while impeding British com1nerce by 
means the use of 'vhich by Great Britain is deprecated by the 
United States Goyernment. (Ibid, p. 458.) 
On August 23 a communication further announced, 
The Achniralty wish to dra'v attention to their previous 'varn-
ing to neutrals of the danger of traversing the North Sea. The 
Germans are continuing their practice of laying 1nines incUs-
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criminately upon the ordinary trade routes. These mines do not 
conform to the conditions of the Hague convention; they do not 
become harn1less after a certain number of hours; they are not 
l:1id in connection with any definite military scheme such as the 
closing of a military port or as a distinct operation against a fight-
ing fleet, but appear to be scattered on the chance of catching 
individual British war or merchant vessels. In consequence of 
this policy neutral ships, no matter what their destination, are 
expo~ed to the gravest dangers. Two Danish vessels, the S.S. 
:Alaryland and the S.S. Broberg, haYe within the last twenty-four 
hours been destroyed by these deadly engines in the North Sea 
while traveling on the ordinary trade routes at a considerable 
distance fron1 the British coast. In additiOn to this, it is re-
ported that two Dutch steamers clearing fron1 Swedish ports 
were yesterday blown up by Gern1an mines in the Baltic. In 
these circumstances the Admira}ty desire to impress not only on 
British but on neutral shipping the vital importance of touching 
at British ports before entering the North Sea, in order to as-
certain according to the latest information the routes and chan-
nels which the Ad1uiralty are keeping swept and along which 
these dangers to neutrals and merchantmen are reduced as far 
as possible. 1-'he Ad1niralty, while reserving to then1selves the 
utmost liberty of retaliatory action against this new form of 
warfare, announce that they haYe not so far laid any mines 
during the present war and that they are endeavouring to keep . 
the sea routes open for peace~ul commerce. (Ibid, p. 458.) 
The Ger1nan Ambassador in a communication to the 
American Secretary of State dated September 10, 1914, 
said, 
1\fr. SEcRETARY oF STATE: By direction of my Government, I 
have the honor respectfully to bring the following to your ex.cel-
lency's knowledge: 
No foundation for idea preYalent among neutrals abroad that 
sea trade with Germany is tied up by blockade of German ports. 
No port is blockaded and nothing stands in the way of neutral 
states' sea trade with Germany. 
Assertions from England that North Sea is infested with Ger-
man mines incorrect. 
Neutral vessels bound for German North Sea ports should steer 
by day for a point 10 nautical miles northwest of Helgoland. 
There German pilots will be provided to bring ships into port. 
Neutral vessels should steer direct for Baltic Sea ports, off 
every one of which there are pilots. 
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Prohibition of coal export not extended to bunker coal, and 
co a ling assured. (Ibid, p. 460.) 
On October 6 the French Government issued a notice 
asserting that Austria-Hungary 'vas illegally laying 
Inines in the Adriatic and that the French Navy 'vould 
lay mines in conforinity 'vith stipulations of Convention 
'TIII. 
Soon protests, notes, counter notes, denials, etc., caine 
fron1 nearly all foreign offices and there follow·ed 'vhat 
one reply characterized as a " volun1e of strong words 
and n1oral indignation." These con1Inunications caine 
fron1 both belligerents each affirming that its opponent 
'vas in the 'vrong, but generally adinitting that the lay-
ing of Inines for defensa under the tern1s of Convention 
VIII 'vas la 'vful. 
Proposals of the United States, 191,5.-The declaration 
by Gerinany of the war zone about Great Britain and 
the controversies· over the use of mines led the United 
States on February 20, 1915, to propose to Gern1any and 
Great Britain the basis of an agreen1ent. 
Gerinany and Great Britain to agree: 
(1) That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon 
the high sea or in territorial waters; that neither will plant on 
the high seas anchored mines except within cannon range of 
harbors for defensive purposes only; and that all mines shall bear 
the stamp of the government planting them and be so constructed 
as to become harmless if separated from their n1oorings; 
(2) That neither will use submarines to attack merchant 
vessels of any nationality except to enforce the right of visit and 
search; 
(3) That each will require their respective n1erchant vessels 
not to use neutral flags for the purpose of disguise or ruse de 
guerre. (1915 U.S. Foreign Relations, Supplement, p. 119.) 
To this proposition the Gern1an Governinent replied, 
February 28: 
With regard to the various points of the American note they beg 
to make the following remarks: 
1. \Vith regard to the sowing of 1nines, the Gennan Governn1ent 
would be willin·g to agree as suggested not to use floating mines 
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and to ha Ye anchored 1nines constructed as indica ted. 1\Ioreover, 
they agree to put the stan1p of the Govern1nent on all mines to be 
planted. on· the other hand, it does not appear to them to be 
feasible. for the belligerents wholly to forego the use of anchored 
1nines for offensive purposes. 
2. The German Government would undertake not to use their 
submarines to attack mercantile of any flag except when necessary 
to enforce the right of visit and search. Should the ene1ny na-
tionality of the vessel or the presence of contraband be ascer-
tained sub1narine- would proceed in accordance with the general 
rules of international law. (Ibid. p. 130.) 
Great Britain did not reply till l\1arch 15 and then 
said: 
On the 22d of February last I received a communication fr01n 
your excellency of the identic note addressed to His lUajesty's 
Govenunent and to Ger1nany respecting an agreement on certain 
points as to tlle conduct of the war at sea. The reply of the Ger-
man Government to his note has been p_ublished and it is not 
understood fron1 the reply that the German Government are pre-
pared to abaridon the practice of sinking British merchant vessels 
by submarines, and it is evident from their reply that they will 
not abandon the use of n1ines for offensive purposes on the high 
seas as contrasted with the use of mines for defensive purposes 
only within cannon range of their own harbours as suggested by 
the Government of the United States. This being so, it n1ight 
appear unnecessary for the British Government to make any 
further reply than to take note of the Gennan answer. vVe desire, 
however, to take the opportunity of 1naking a fuller statement of 
the whole position and of our feeling with regard t0 it. (Ibid, p. 
140.) 
There follo,ved in the so1nevvhat long note a statement 
in regard to the German conduct of the vvar and of the 
grounds which Great Britain considered as just.ifying its 
action on various matters. 
Swnrnary of the aititude of the United S.tates.-The 
Counselor for the Department of State, Frank L. Polk, 
sent to Representative John J. Fitzgerald, a meinoran-
dum upon the attitude taken by the Department of State 
in way of protest against action of belligerents consid-
ered in violation of the principles of international law. 
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The summary of the attitude toward the use of mines up 
to August 18, 1916, was stated as follows: 
The illegal use of mines in the present war has not been con--
fined to any one belligerent. Both sides have violated the rights. 
of neutrals and have sown large areas of the high seas 'vith 
mines, the result of which has been the destruction of a number-
of neutral vessels. 
On August 7, 19,14, the German Govern1nent notified all neutral 
countries that the trade routes to English ports ·would be closed 
by mines. 
In a note dated August 11, 19114, the British Ambassador al-. 
leged that Germany had scattered contact mines indiscriminately 
about the North Sea, and informed this Government that in view· 
of this fact the British Admiralty would adopt sin1ilar methods. 
in self-defense. 
On August 13 the Secretary of State protested against such 
action on the part of Great Britain, stating that even " if an 
enemy of His Majesty's Government has, as asserted, endangered 
neutral commerce by an act in violation of the Hague conven-
tion, which cannot be justified on the ground of military neces-
sity," this country sa'v no reason for Great Britain adopting a 
similar course which would add further to the dangers to peace-
ful navigation of the high seas by vessels of neutral powers. 
On November 3, 1914, Great Britain, alleging that during the-
past week the German Government had scattered mines indis--
criminately in the open seas and on n1ain trade routes from 
America to Liverpool via the north of Ireland, that peaceful 
merchant ships have already been blown up, and that the mines 
were laid by some merchant vessels flying neutral flags, declared' 
the North Sea a military area, and that all ships that did not 
follo'v an indicated course would be in grave danger from the-
mines it had been necessary to lay. 
On February 4, 1915, Germany in retaliation for various alleged 
illegal acts on the part of Great Britain, notified neutral nations. 
that "the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, includ-
ing the 'vhole English Channel, are hereby declared a war zone.',. 
It was indicated at the same time that they would ignore the rule-
of international law requiring visit and search and would sink 
merchantmen without first ascertaining whether they were neutral . 
or ene1ny ships and without making provisions for the safety of 
passengers and crew. 
To this proclamation the United States on February 10, 1915,. 
protested, and pointed out that such action on the part of Ger-
many would endanger the lives and property of citizens of neu-
RESUME 107 
tral and friendly nations, and would violate the principles of 
international law. In its note the United States stated that: 
"The Government of the United States has not consented to 
or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken by 
the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate 
to restrain neutral trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all 
such matters a position which warrants it in holding those gov-
ernments responsible in the proper way for any unlawful effects 
upon American shipping which the accepted principles of interna-
tional la'v do not justify, and that it therefore regards itself 
as free in the present instance to take, with a clear conscience 
and upon accepted principles, the position indicated in this note." 
On February 20, 1915, the United States in the interest of neu-
tral commerce sent identic notes to Germany and Great Britain 
in which the hope was expressed that these two belligerents "may 
through reciprocal concessions, find a basis for agreement which 
will relieve neutral ships engaged in peaceful comn1erce from the 
great dangers which they will incur on the high seas adjacent 
to the coasts of the belligerents," and outlined a course of action 
with regard to the sowing of mines and the importation of food-
stuffs into Germany, to which it \Vas hoped they would agree. 
Unfortunately it was not possible to secure the consent of the two 
Governments to the proposal. (1916 U.S. Foreign Relations, 
Supplement, p. 5.) 
Resurne.-.. \iVhile strained relations may cause a state 
to exercise such 1neasures as it may deem expedient 
within the laws of peace, such relations do not permit. 
the exercise of the rights of war toward third states. 
The Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928, declares against 
war, but not against resort to peaceful measures for 
settling differences between states. A strait which is the 
sole highway com1nunication between two open seas, as 
the Strait of Gibraltar, may not be closed in peace or 
war, while a strait "\vhich forms a more convenient or 
more commonly used highway to which there is a reason-
able alternative way 1nay be subject to such restrictive 
measures upon its use as the adjacent states may deem 
essential for self-defense. The use of radio is generally 
prescribed by international conventions to which the 
leading states of the world are parties. The conventions 
do not give to a state jurisdiction outside territorial limits 
over vessels not flying its flag though in time of war 
73500-34--8 
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rules 1nay be 1nore extended and action necessary for 
self-defense n1ay be taken in the in11nediate area of bellig-
erent operations. In recent years, since 1907, most 
states have by convention or in practice not resorted to 
'var without previous declaration many of 'vhich in the 
VVorld War contained detailed reasons and specific indi-
cation of the time when the status of 'var 'vould exist. 
After such declaration the use of submarine 1nines under 
enumerated restrictions is pern1itted by the Convention 
of 1907. 
SOLUTION 
1. In ti1ne of peace.-(a) States C and D have no 
exceptional rights of jurisdiction over a strait along their 
coasts connecting generally used "\Vater areas, though 
states C and D may take action necessary for self-
defense. 
(b) Vessels of other states have the right of innocent 
passage through the strait but they are subject to rea-
sonable regulations 'vhile 'vithin the territorial 'vaters of 
Cor D. 
(c) The Bara as a. n1erchant vessel of state B is en-
tirely exempt from the jurisdiction of state C 'vhile on 
the high sea, but must confor1n to the regulations of state 
C and D when within the jurisdiction of those states. 
2. In tiJne of ~oar.-( a) States C and D have a right to 
regulate the use of their territorial waters and the 'vaters 
'vithin the imn1ediate area of their operations. 
(b) Vessels of neutral states have the right of innocent 
passage through the strait though they are subject to 
reasonable regulations while 'vithin the territorial 'vaters 
of C or D. In view of the fact that the strait is not the 
sole but the more convenient and con11nonly used 'vater-
'vay, the rights of C or D may, as an extreme Ineasure, 
extend to closing of the strait. 
(c) After the declaration of 'var, the Bara, as a Iller-
chant vessel of state B, is under obligation to observe the 
regulations of state C or D 'vhen 'vithin the territorial 
jurisdiction or the in11necliate area of the operation of 
their forces. 
